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Fraud by the Supreme Court:
Racial Discrimination by a State Institution of
Higher Education Upheld on "Diversity" Grounds
Lino A. Graglia*
I. INTRODUCTION
Dishonesty has been characteristic of the Supreme Court's decisions
on race at least since 1968 when it held in Green v. County School
Board' that official race discrimination is sometimes not only
constitutionally permissible but, for the first time in our history,
constitutionally required. In that case, the Court performed the
extraordinary feat of changing a prohibition of race discrimination into
a requirement of race discrimination while insisting that no change had
been made.2 Grutter v. Bollinger,3 upholding race discrimination by a
state law school on the ground that it was "narrowly tailored" to serve a
"compelling state interest" in educationally valuable "diversity," carries
this characteristic dishonesty to, if possible, new extremes. The purpose
of race-preferencing in student admission programs in higher education
is to admit blacks to selective schools to which they could not otherwise
be admitted, in order to save the schools from the political and
ideological embarrassment of having no, or very few, blacks.
The University of Michigan Law School, along with virtually all
other selective colleges and universities, has practiced racial
discrimination in granting and denying admission since or shortly after
1968,4 when it was apparently permitted by the Green decision.5 In
* A. Dalton Cross Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law, Austin, Texas.
1. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
2. For a full discussion of the Court's reasoning in Green, see generally LINO A. GRAGLIA,
DISASTER BY DECREE: THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON RACE AND THE SCHOOLS (1976).
3. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
4. See, e.g., Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996) (invalidating race preferences at
the University of Texas School of Law); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 507 P.2d 1169 (Wash. 1973),
vacated by 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (upholding race preferences at the University of Washington
School of Law); Lino A. Graglia, Special Admissions of the "Culturally Deprived" to Law
School, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 351 (1970) (arguing against racial preferences in college and
university admissions).
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Grutter, the Court held, in an opinion by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
(with Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia,
Anthony Kennedy, and Clarence Thomas dissenting), that such
discrimination is permissible if each applicant is given "individualized
consideration" in "competition with all other applicants."6 A challenge
by rejected white applicants, who concededly would have been admitted
if they were of a preferred race, was therefore rejected. In a companion
case, Gratz v. Bollinger,7 the Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice
Rehnquist (with Justices John Paul Stevens, David Souter, and Ruth
Bader Ginsburg dissenting), disallowed race discrimination by the
University of Michigan College of Literature, Sciences and Arts
because the magnitude of the preference was specified.
II. FROM PROHIBITING TO PERMITTING OR REQUIRING RACE
DISCRIMINATION
A. The Undoing of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
The legal question presented by Grutter and Gratz was not, or at least
should not have been, a difficult one. Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act prohibits race discrimination by any institution that receives federal
funds.8 There was no doubt that the University of Michigan received
federal funds or that it racially discriminated. Its violation of that
statute was therefore clear, obviating any need or occasion to consider
the question of constitutionality. This was the position taken by Justice
Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justices William
Rehnquist and Potter Stewart, when the Court first considered the
question in Regents of University of California v. Bakke in 1978. 9 But
for their lack of one more vote, the era of race preferences would have
come to an end. Justices William J. Brennan, Jr., Byron White, Harry
Blackmun, and Thurgood Marshall, however, asserted, in an unusual
5. See Green, 391 U.S. at 441-42 (holding that elimination of racial discrimination in the
operation of a school system did not constitute compliance with Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483 (1954), because a high degree of integration did not result).
6. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334-35.
7. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000 & West Supp. 2004). Under Title VI, "[n]o person in the United
States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
federal financial assistance." See id.
9. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 360-61 (1978) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(arguing that the admissions program plainly violated Title VI and a constitutional inquiry was
not called for).
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joint opinion, that Title VI was "cryptic,"' and the ninth Justice, Lewis
Powell, declared that it was "majestic."" Despite these apparently
contradictory readings, they reached the same conclusion: Title VI does
not prohibit all race discrimination by federally funded institutions,
despite what it plainly says and was unquestionably intended to mean.
This was the first act of blatant judicial dishonesty from which all else
in Bakke and now in Grutter followed. In a legal system seriously
concerned with controlling judicial misbehavior, it would have been
subject to sanction.
B. The Subversion of Brown
On the constitutional question, some background, unfortunately, is
necessary. The modern constitutional law of race discrimination begins,
of course, with the 1954 decision of Brown v. Board of Education,
holding unconstitutional state statutes requiring the assignment of
students to separate schools by race. 12 In a pointless attempt to avoid
explicitly overruling the "separate but equal" doctrine of Plessy v.
Ferguson,13 the Court purported to base the decision on a finding that
racially segregated schools were "inherently unequal."' 4  In a
companion case, Boiling v. Sharpe,15 involving school segregation in
the District of Columbia, in Brown H116 one year later, and in a series of
non-school cases that quickly followed, 7 the Court dropped the
pretense and seemed to make clear that the Constitution was now to be
understood as prohibiting all official race discrimination. The Court,
however, was unable to enforce its constitutional prohibition, and
uniquely in constitutional history, did not attempt to do so. For one
thing, resistant states had the option of simply ending free (and
compulsory) public school education and returning education, like most
goods and services in a free market economy, to individual choice. 18
10. Id. at 340 (Brennan, White, Marshall, & Blackmun, JJ., concurring).
11. Id. at 284.
12. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) [hereinafter Brown I].
13. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
14. Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 495.
15. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
16. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) [hereinafter Brown II].
17. See, e.g., Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (outlawing discrimination on buses);
Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (striking down discrimination on municipal golf
courses); Mayor of Bait. v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (outlawing discrimination in public
beaches and bath houses).
18. Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (disallowing the distribution of money
grants to attend segregated private schools while the public schools of the county remained
closed).
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The Court, therefore, issued no order requiring compliance with Brown,
and the following year in Brown H required compliance only "as soon
as practicable,"' 19 which the states of the deep South understood to mean
''never."
The great contribution of Brown was that, though it did not end
segregation, it gave impetus to a decade of efforts by others to do so.
President Kennedy's assassination, Dr. Martin Luther King's civil rights
marches, Lyndon B. Johnson's presidency, and the generally recognized
indefensibility of race discrimination by government led finally to the
great 1964 Civil Rights Act. 20 The Act in effect ratified what Congress
and everyone else understood to be the Brown principle-a prohibition
against all official race discrimination-making it effective as to
schools (Title IV)2' and extending it to all federally funded activities
(Title VI), 22 private employment (Title VII), 23 and places of public
accommodation (Title 11).24 Brown, it appeared, had finally triumphed,
and school segregation soon came to an end. The history of the law of
race discrimination since the Act, however, is a history of both the
Brown principle and the various provisions of the Act being stood on
their heads.
School segregation ended in the South, but the residential racial
concentration that is typical of all urban areas meant that "racially
balanced" neighborhood schools would not be the result, any more than
such schools existed in the rest of the nation. Spurred by civil rights
organizations that had grown and prospered in the wake of Brown and
riding a crest of moral acclaim, the Court decided to make an even more
daring and much less justifiable move supposedly in the interest of
racial equality. In Green, by holding unconstitutional the operation of a
school district from which all racial discrimination had concededly been
removed, because only limited racial integration resulted, the Court
effectively changed the constitutional requirement from a prohibition of
19. Brown H, 349 U.S. at 300.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (2000 & West Supp. 2004). And then to the drastic but effective 1965
Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1978 (2000 & West Supp. 2004), and the 1968 Civil
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2000).
21. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-2000c-9 (2000) (defining all public schools as those institutions
operated by a state, subdivision of a state, governmental agency, or using funds derived from a
governmental source).
22. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-2000d-7 (2000) (ensuring no person be denied on the basis of
color from participation in a program receiving federal funds).
23. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17 (2000) (establishing the doctrine of Equal Employment
Opportunity).
24. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-2000a-6 (2000) (stating that "all persons shall be entitled to full
and equal enjoyment.., of any place of public accommodation").
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segregation to compulsory integration, even though this meant not
prohibiting, but requiring racial discrimination in school assignments. 25
For several reasons, the Court could not, however, openly announce a
requirement of school racial integration and has always denied that
there is such a requirement. For one thing, it would have been expected
to state the benefits to be obtained from compulsory integration that
would justify the costs, something it has never attempted to do. Further,
a simple requirement of racially mixed schools would have immediately
been applicable nationwide-to the schools of Chicago as well as
Birmingham-and therefore met unified and undoubtedly successful
resistance. Perhaps most important, the Court would have had to reject
or at least qualify the Brown principle prohibiting all official racial
discrimination, and tampering with Brown was the last thing it wanted
to do. The Court avoided all these difficulties by simply insisting that it
was not requiring integration as such, but something very different,
"desegregation," the ending and undoing of the segregation prohibited
in Brown. The requirement therefore needed no further justification,
would apparently apply only to the South, and instead of having to
overturn or qualify Brown, the Court could claim to be actually
enforcing it. Official racial discrimination was being required, it was
true, but only to "remedy" official racial discrimination, fighting fire
with fire.
The sole disadvantage of the Court's claim to require race
discrimination only to remedy race discrimination was that it was
untrue. The requirement, the Court said in Green, was "a system in
which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch, 26 but
racial discrimination, the lower courts found, the plaintiffs conceded,27
and the Court did not question, had already been eliminated. That
compulsory integration could not be justified as desegregation became
even clearer in 1971 when the Court in Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education28 required busing for racial balance in
the giant Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North Carolina, School District.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg's schools were no more racially imbalanced and
the imbalance was no more due to past segregation than the schools of,
say, Los Angeles. While the Court held that federal judges could order
racial assignment only for "desegregation," to remedy Brown-prohibited
25. See generally GRAGLIA, supra note 2 (discussing the Court's move from prohibiting to
requiring racial discrimination in school assignments and the consequences of this development).
26. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968).
27. See Bowman v. County Sch. Bd., 382 F.2d 326, 328 (4th Cir. 1967) (recognizing that the
plaintiffs conceded their annual choice of schools is unrestricted).
28. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
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segregation, it added as pure dictum that school boards were free to do
so to increase racial integration for its own sake.29 Two years later, the
Court required the "desegregation" of the Denver, Colorado, school
system which had never been segregated. 30  There could be no doubt
that the requirement was simply racial balance or integration for its own
sake, and that the Court's insistence to the contrary was due to the fact
that the remedy rationale was seen as the only possible way to justify
race discrimination.
C. The Undoing of Titles IV and VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
Title IV of the 1964 Civil Rights Act also requires, just as the Court
purports to, not integration as such, but only "desegregation."31  The
only difference is that the Court's definition of "desegregation" is
precisely the opposite of the Act's. Title IV carefully defines
"desegregation" as "the assignment of students to public schools...
without regard to their race." 32 It then adds, redundantly, in a super-
abundance of caution, "but 'desegregation' shall not mean the
assignment of students to public schools in order to overcome racial
imbalance." 33  The Act in effect repeats twice more that it is racial
assignment and only racial assignment that is forbidden.
34
All to no avail. The utility and efficacy of law depends entirely on
the good faith of those who apply the law-pre-existing authoritative
rules stated in words-and, on issues of race, good faith on the part of
the Court has been entirely lacking. In surely one of the boldest moves
in its long history of bold moves, the Court simply declared that
requiring that students be assigned to schools by race to increase
integration was not inconsistent with Congress doing all it could to
prevent precisely that.35 Fears by southern Congressmen that Senator
Hubert Humphrey, floor manager of the bill that became Title IV,
dismissed as "bogeymen and hobgoblins" soon proved to be all too
real.36 It would be difficult to find a clearer example of persons free of
external control assuming that their good intentions exempted them
from the restraint of good faith.
29. Id. at 7.
30. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000c (2000 & West Supp. 2004).
32. See id. at § 2000c(b).
33. See id.
34. See id. at § 2000c-9 (stating that "nothing... shall prohibit classifications and assignment
for reasons other than race...").
35. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1971).
36. 110 CONG. REc. 6552 (1964).
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What the Court did to Title IV of the 1964 Act in Green and Swann it
did, in effect, to Title VII in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.37 in 1971, by
converting its prohibition of race discrimination in employment into a
requirement of race discrimination by holding that employers may not
use ordinary employment criteria, such as level of education, when the
effect is to disproportionately disqualify blacks. In United Steelworkers
of America v. Weber,38 the Court held explicitly that Title VII does not
prohibit discrimination against whites. Finally, and more to the present
point, what the Court did to Title IV in Green and Swann and Title VII
in Griggs and Weber it did to Title VI, as noted above, in Bakke, by
permitting a federally funded institution to practice discrimination
against whites.
III. BAKKE: JUSTICE POWELL'S ATTEMPT TO FIND A MIDDLE WAY
BETWEEN PROHIBITING AND PERMITTING RACE DISCRIMINATION
According to Green and Swann, race discrimination is not only no
longer prohibited but may actually be required in grade school
assignments when supposedly necessary for "desegregation," and
according to Swann, it may at the option of school boards be required
simply to increase integration. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that
college and university administrators concluded that race discrimination
is at least permissible in higher education. This was the conclusion of
the Washington Supreme Court in 1974 when it upheld as constitutional
the use of race preferences in granting admission to the University of
Washington Law School.39  The Supreme Court, after agreeing to
review the case, dismissed it as "moot," 40 with only Justice Douglas
(never reluctant to decide a policy issue)41 reaching the merits in adissenting opinion.42 Douglas, to the surprise of many, would have held
the discrimination unconstitutional,43 even though he was not successful
in attempting to reconcile that conclusion with Swann.44 It seemed
clear, nonetheless, that race preferences in higher education would be
37. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
38. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
39. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 507 P.2d 1169 (Wash. 1973), vacated by 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
40. DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 319-20.
41. See, e.g., Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S. 934, 935-39 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(presenting Justice Douglas's willingness to decide the legality of the Vietnam War).
42. DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 320-49 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 342 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 343 (Douglas, J., dissenting); see GRAGLIA, supra note 2, at 261 (pointing out that
the Court in Swann stated that school authorities could seek school racial balance for its own
sake, not, as Douglas argued, only as a remedy for past segregation).
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disallowed when the Court finally passed on the issue, for surely one
could not expect to find five Justices to the left of Douglas, who was
probably, along with Brennan, one of the two most liberal-activist
Justices in our history.
The expectation proved incorrect when in Bakke, five Justices, after
disposing of Title VI as merely replicating the Constitution, held that
the Constitution does not disallow all race preferences. 45  The four
Justices led by Brennan concluded that the Constitution does not
prohibit discrimination disadvantaging whites to the same extent as
discrimination disadvantaging blacks, and would have upheld such
discrimination on the by-then well-established remedy rationale. 46
Although there was no evidence that the University of California at
Davis Medical School ever discriminated against blacks, the four
Justices would have upheld granting them preference as a remedy for
"societal discrimination," 47 on the apparent assumption that there could,
after all, be no other explanation of the need for preference.
Justice Powell, faced with four Justices who would have totally
disallowed and four who would have totally upheld the race preferences
involved, sought, as was his wont,48 a middle way, even though this
meant, as usual, attempting to have it both ways. Race discrimination is
race discrimination, he insisted, equally forbidden by the Equal
Protection Clause regardless of the favored or disadvantaged racial
group.49  Finding "societal discrimination" 5  vague and indefinite
enough to permit virtually any preference for blacks, but unwilling to
disallow all preferences, he sought an alternative to the remedy
rationale. The faculty and administration at Harvard University, Powell
credulously believed, were clever enough to have had already
discovered one: Educationally valuable "diversity," which the Court
should accept, he said, on the basis of the First Amendment's protection
of academic freedom. 51 Harvard's objective was not, it insisted, racial
diversity as such, to simply increase, say, black enrollment-that,
indeed, Powell said, would be "patently unconstitutional" 52-but to
45. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 285-87 (1978).
46. Id. at 324-26.
47. Id. at 310.
48. See, e.g., Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 218 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring)
(demonstrating that compulsory integration could not, as the Court claimed, be justified as a
remedy for past official race discrimination, but then proceeding to justify it on just those
grounds). For a detailed discussion, see GRAGLIA, supra note 2, at 185-90.
49. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320.
50. Id. at 310.
51. Id. at 321-24.
52. Id.
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obtain a student body with an educationally-valuable variety of
experience and views.53 Powell attached as an appendix to his opinion
a copy of the "Harvard College Admissions Program," fully endorsed it,
and in effect raised it to the status of constitutional law.
54
The Harvard College Admissions Program is, unfortunately, as is
almost necessarily true of attempts to justify race preferences, a
compendium of lies and hypocrisies. The Program states, for example,
that "scholarly excellence [is not] the sole"-as everyone no doubt
thought-"or even predominant criterion" for admission to Harvard.
55
An "essential ingredient to the educational process" at Harvard, it
appears, is "diversity." 56 For years, the Program continues, Harvard
sought diversity in terms of geography and special skills, talents, and
experiences. 57  "The result," for some unexplained reason, "was that
very few ethnic or racial minorities attended Harvard College."
58
Harvard College, therefore, "recently expanded the concept of diversity
to include students from disadvantaged economic, racial, and other
groups. Harvard College now recruits not only Californians or
Louisianans but also blacks and Chicanos and other minority
students."59 The result is that "the race of an applicant may tip the
balance in his favor just as geographic origin or a life spent on a farm
may favorably tip the balance in other candidates' cases."
60
Each of these statements is false or misleading, beginning most
basically with the pretense that the purpose of the program is to obtain
educationally-relevant diversity. There can be no real doubt that the
program would not have been instituted or have continued to exist
except for that they felt the need to enroll more blacks. It is false that
Harvard's earlier pursuit of geographic or other diversity is the reason
few blacks attended Harvard; the reason was that few met or came close
to meeting Harvard's admission standards. It is false that race
preference programs are meant to aid the disadvantaged, very few of
whom are in a position to apply to Harvard.61 If disadvantage were the
53. Id. at 322.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 321.
56. Id. at 322.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 323.
61. "[T]he Law School's racial discrimination does nothing for those too poor or uneducated
to participate in elite higher education .... " Grutter v. Gratz, 539 U.S. 306, 355 (2003) (Thomas,
J., dissenting).
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concern, disadvantage would be the criterion. Race is not a proxy for
disadvantage; not all and not only blacks have been disadvantaged. The
University of Texas Law School, for example, never denied preferential
admission to a black on the ground that he was not disadvantaged or
was exceptionally advantaged, and it is unlikely Harvard ever did either.
It is false that discrimination on the basis of race can be compared
with discrimination on the basis of geography or "life spent on a farm."
Race discrimination is uniquely offensive and divisive, stereotype
reinforcing, and inconsistent with the maintenance of a multiracial
society, apart from having led to the Civil War and being the subject of
three constitutional amendments. Ironically, it is critically and centrally
false that race is considered only to "tip the balance" in close cases; the
black/white test score gap is much too large to be bridged except by
very large preferences.
The Harvard program goes on to speak, fantastically, of possibly
having so many black applicants "who grew up in an inner-city ghetto
[with] semi-literate parents" that it might give preference to a lower-
scoring black child of a physician or even an exceptionally talented
white.62 In fact, highly selective schools necessarily accept all or nearly
all of the most highly qualified black students they can get in order to
meet their self-imposed quotas or "goals" for black enrollment, very
few of whom will come close to meeting their ordinary admission
standards63 and almost none of whom will be from a "ghetto"
background. The fact that the alleged danger of getting a surplus of
qualified blacks with a "ghetto" background has no relation to reality
did not prevent Harvard from asserting it as a fact or Justice Powell
from finding it impressive enough to make it the basis of American
constitutional law on the subject of race preference. 64
Harvard, Justice Powell apparently convinced himself, had found a
way not merely to justify race discrimination in higher education, but to
make the fact of race discrimination disappear. Explicit, admitted race
discrimination ceases to be race discrimination, he argued in effect, if it
is (supposedly) immersed in enough discrimination on other grounds.
An applicant who then "loses out" to another who receives "a 'plus' on
the basis of ethnic background.., will not have been foreclosed from
62. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 324. For a full discussion, see Lino A. Graglia, Grutter and Gratz:
Race Preferences to Increase Racial Representation Held "Patently Unconstitutional" Unless
Done Subtly Enough in the Name of "Diversity," 78 TUL. L. REv. 2037 (2004).
63. See infra notes 107-30 and accompanying text (discussing disparities between black and
white standardized test scores).
64. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 321 (adding the Harvard College Admissions Program as an
appendix to his opinion).
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all consideration ... simply because he was not the right color or had
the wrong surname." 65  Whether or not he is foreclosed, the fact
obviously remains that he will be at a disadvantage, and in practice a
very large disadvantage, "because he was not the right color or had the
wrong surname."
66
The "principal evil" of an unconstitutional "quota" program, Powell
correctly pointed out, is its "denial ... [of an applicant's] right to
individualized consideration without regard to his race." 67 But that, of
course, is exactly the right that the Harvard program denies to
applicants. The whole point of the program is to consider each
applicant with regard to his race. Under the Harvard program, Powell
incredibly concluded that non-preferred applicants whom were rejected
"have no basis to complain of unequal treatment under the Fourteenth
Amendment." 68 Rejected white and Asian applicants must understand
that they are not victims of race discrimination despite the fact that they,
like plaintiffs Grutter and Gratz, would have been admitted if they were
of a preferred race. All Powell has succeeded in demonstrating is the
logician's dictum that from self-contradiction all conclusions follow and
that in constitutional law arguments are acceptable that would be
considered ludicrous in a discipline that aspired to the level of
intellectual integrity of, say, astrology.
IV. GRUTTER: JUSTICE POWELL'S ILLOGICAL BAKKE OPINION
IS MADE AN OPINION OF THE COURT
Defects in logic and misstatements of fact do not lessen the
authoritativeness of Supreme Court decisions in the make-believe world
of constitutional law, a consequence of the inestimable advantage of
being subject to no review.69 Illogical or not, Powell's Bakke opinion
settled for the nation as a whole for a quarter of a century the
enormously important question of race preferences in higher education.
Since the effect of Grutter is to raise the Powell opinion to the status of
an opinion of the Court, it will now seemingly settle it for at least
another quarter of a century. 70 There was apparently nothing about the
65. Id. at 318.
66. But see id. (insisting that a white applicant's qualifications have been weighed fairly
despite not receiving a "plus" such as his minority counterpart would have received).
67. Id. at 318 n.52.
68. Id. at 318.
69. "We are not final," Justice Robert Jackson famously pointed out, "because we are
infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final." Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540
(1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
70. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (expressing the expectation that
2004]
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 36
Powell opinion or the Harvard program it is based upon that the Grutter
Court did not find convincing. So persuasive did Justice O'Connor find
Powell's argument that an applicant who loses out to another whose
race was a "'plus' factor," and who clearly would have been accepted if
he had that "plus," has no claim of race discrimination that she quoted it
in full.7'
A. The "Diversity" Fraud
The fundamental and overarching falsehood of Grutter, as of the
Harvard program and the Powell opinion it is based upon, is the
pretense that the purpose of race preference admission programs in
higher education is to obtain an educationally-valuable diversity of
opinion in the student body-so valuable as to justify putting state
officials into the business of classifying people by race for disparate
treatment and the very substantial lowering of academic standards
necessarily involved. It is probably safe to say that no minimally
informed person really believes this, 72 although some academics are
willing to proclaim it, at least as a debating point.73  It is inherently
preferences will not be needed in twenty-five years).
71. Id. at 341 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318).
72. See, e.g., Alan M. Dershowitz & Laura Hanft, Affirmative Action and the Harvard College
Diversity-Discretion Model: Paradigm or Pretext, 1 CARDOZO L. REV. 379, 407 (1979)
(asserting that "[tihe raison d'9tre for race-specific affirmative action programs has simply never
been diversity for the sake of education"); Brian P. Fitzpatrick, The Diversity Lie, 27 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 385, 395-96 (2003) (noting that many members of the academic establishment
actually support affirmative action for reasons of social justice, not the educational benefits of
diversity); Kent Greenawalt, The Unresolved Problems of Reverse Discrimination, 67 CAL. L.
REV. 87, 122 (1979) (stating "I have yet to find a professional academic who believes the primary
motivation for preferential admission has been to promote diversity in the student body for the
better education of all the students."); Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal
Constitution: Culture, Courts and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 63 (2003) (noting that diversity has
"displayed little or no relationship to the actual reasons why affirmative action had become
prominent in American higher education"); Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J.
427, 471 (1997) (arguing that "[elveryone knows that in most cases a true diversity of
perspectives and backgrounds is not really being pursued. (Why no preferences for
fundamentalist Christians or for neo-Nazis?)"); Daniel Golden, Some Backers of Racial
Preference Take Legal Stand Beyond Diversity: Society Wins with Integrated Elite, WALL ST. J.,
June 14, 2003, at B I (quoting Columbia Law School Professor Samuel Issacharoff, who said,
"[tihe commitment to diversity is not real. None of these universities has an affirmative-action
program for Christian fundamentalists, Muslims, orthodox Jews, or any other group that has a
distinct viewpoint.").
73. See, e.g., Arnold H. Loewy, Taking Bakke Seriously: Distinguishing Diversity From
Affirmative Action in the Law School Admissions Process, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1479 (1999)
(differentiating diversity and affirmative action and arguing that a policy of diversity is fair and
constitutional in law school admissions). But see Lino A. Graglia, Professor Loewy's Defense of
Racial Preference: Defining Discrimination Away, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1505 (1999) (responding to
Loewy's distinction between diversity and affirmative action and asserting that policies of
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implausible that adding a few less-qualified blacks, overwhelmingly of
middle or upper-middle class background, to a classroom or campus at a
selective school will significantly contribute to their classmates'
education. It is much more likely to lead to or reinforce the view that
even advantaged blacks are not fully academically competitive. The
best available, if not the only, actual empirical study of the issue, quoted
by Justice Thomas 74 but ignored by Justice O'Connor, reached the more
plausible conclusion that race preferences are harmful to education.
75
Former University of Michigan law dean Terence Sandalow, a
proponent of race preferences, has pointed out that any differences
between whites and blacks in experience "are simply irrelevant to most
of what students study in the course of their undergraduate courses," not
only to mathematics and the natural sciences, but also to "most of the
humanities and social sciences":
[E]ven though the subjects I teach deal extensively with racial issues, I
cannot recall an instance in which, for example, ideas were expressed
by a black student that have not also been expressed by white students.
Black students do, at times, call attention to the racial implications of
issues that are not facially concerned with race, but white and Asian-
American students are in my experience no less likely to do so.
7 6
Yale law professor Peter Schuck commented, this "accords precisely
with my own experience," 77 as it does also with mine, in many years of
teaching a course on race discrimination.
B. The Real Reasons for Racial Preferences
in Selective Institutions of Higher Education
Race preferences were not instituted at selective schools beginning in
the late 1960s because of a new pedagogical theory or discovery as to
the educational benefits of increasing a school's black enrollment. They
were instituted at that time because the Green and Swann decisions
diversity have nothing to do with obtaining educational benefits).
74. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 364 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Stanley Rothman et al., Racial
Diversity Reconsidered, 151 THE PUBLIC INTEREST 25 (2003)).
75. According to Stanley Rothman:
[Tihe greater the school's diversity, the less students were satisfied with their own
educational experience. In addition, greater diversity was associated with perceptions
of less academic effort among students and a poorer overall educational experience.
Finally, enrollment diversity was positively related to students' experience of unfair
treatment, even after the effects of all other variables were controlled.
Stanley Rothman et al., Racial Diversity Reconsidered, 151 THE PUBLIC INTEREST 25, 36 (2003).
76. PETER H. SCHUCK, DIVERSITY IN AMERICA: KEEPING GOVERNMENT AT A SAFE
DISTANCE 167 (2003).
77. Id.
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made clear that they could be-because not all official race
discrimination was necessarily prohibited, as everyone thought-and
because they served several interests. For academic liberals-the
overwhelming majority at elite institutions 78 -race is a club with which
to beat up on America. It is the indispensable element of their self-
imposed mission to point out the nation's shortcomings; for them, the
race issue simply cannot be permitted to go away. 79 In addition, many
persons who found gainful and satisfying employment in the many civil
rights organizations that grew up and prospered in the wake of Brown
were not about to give it up merely because the battle against
segregation had been won; for them, a new "advance" in civil rights
would always be needed.
Most important for elite schools is that race neutrality, it became
painfully obvious, could prove to be a political and ideological
embarrassment. No blacks attended segregated institutions of higher
education because none could be admitted, and few attended non-
segregated institutions because, supposedly, of widespread racial
discrimination. But why did none or so few attend after segregation
ended and official and public discrimination were prohibited? The
argument based on the continuing burdens of past discrimination, even
for clearly advantaged blacks, became less persuasive with each passing
year. The continuing absence of blacks at elite institutions became
increasingly difficult to explain. Race preferences became necessary to
spare those institutions from the by-then devastating charge of being
"all-white" or, even worse, "lily-white" institutions. The extraordinary
academic success of Asian students 80 removed any danger of elite
78. See, e.g., Karl Zinsmeister, The Shame of America's One-Party Campuses, AM.
ENTERPRISE, Sept. 2002, at 18 (discussing the results of a study that shows most faculty at
colleges and universities identify themselves as liberal).
79. Cf. Vernellia R. Randall, Racist Health Care: Reforming an Unjust Health Care System to
Meet the Needs of African-Americans, 3 HEALTH MATRIX 127, 133 (1993) ("Given the fact that
the pervasive nature of racism in American society affects African-Americans at all economic
levels, there cannot be 'complete... mental and social well-being' for African-Americans until
the problem of racism in society is addressed and resolved."); Sharon Elizabeth Rush, Sharing
Space: Why Racial Goodwill Isn't Enough, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1, 70 (1999) ("White society must
continue to take affirmative steps to equalize the racial imbalance in America, or give up its
image as an anti-racist society altogether.").
80. See STEPHAN THERNSTROM & ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN BLACK AND WHITE:
ONE NATION INDIVISIBLE 399-400 (1997).
Just 3.5 percent of the population in 1995, Asians were 13 percent of all students
scoring 700 or more on the verbals and a stunning 27 percent of those with 750 and up
in math. If we look at a still more rarified level of achievement-at the 734 superstar
students named Advanced Placement Scholars by the College Board in 1995 because
they had high grades on eight different AP tests-the picture is still more dramatic. An
amazing 29.7 percent of all the winners were Asians, and 53.1 percent were non-
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institutions being all-white, but not of their real concern, being virtually
all non-black.
The reality at the root of race preference programs in higher
education is that very few blacks meet the ordinary admission standards
of elite schools, and this is seen by liberal academics as both
unchangeable and politically and ideologically intolerable. We have
race preferences, as Derek Bok, former president of Harvard,81 stated
more candidly than Justice O'Connor could, because their elimination
would mean "a severe drop in the number of black students, especially
at more selective colleges and universities." 82 The result would be to
"reduce black enrollments to 1.5 percent or less [not merely the 4
percent O'Connor referred to in Grutter] in scores of selective colleges
and professional schools." 83  This was a problem, he asserted, not
because it would embarrass Harvard liberals-himself as president very
much included-but because it would have "a devastating effect on the
morale and aspirations of blacks." 84 Why anyone should be devastated
because he was denied admission to an institution for which he does not
meet the ordinary admission standards, Bok did not explain. Since
denial of admission to a highly selective school usually means
attendance at a less selective school for which the applicant is better
qualified, the effect is probably to lessen or avoid injury to morale and
aspiration.
C. Justice O'Connor's Previous Insistence
on "Strict Scrutiny" for All Official Race Discrimination
Racial preferences were instituted by law schools and medical
schools in the 1960s, Professor Robert Sedler, a long-time proponent of
racial preferences, has pointed out, "not to obtain a racially diverse
student body," but simply to increase the enrollment of blacks and other
racial minorities who were "under-represented" in the legal and medical
professions. 85 The only way this could be justified, it was thought, was
Hispanic Whites. Just 2 out of the 734-less than 0.3 percent-were African-
American.
Id.
81. Derek Bok later co-authored the leading defense of race preferences in higher education
(WILLIAM G. BOWDEN & DEREK C. BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER (1998)), which was cited in
Grutter, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003).
82. Derek Bok, Admitting Success, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 4, 1985, at 15.
83. Bok, supra note 82, at 39. Cf Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 320 (2003) (noting that
the elimination of race as a factor in the admission process would reduce the percentage of
underrepresented minority students from 14.5% to 4% of the entering class in 2000).
84. Bok, supra note 82, at 39.
85. Robert A. Sedler, Affirmative Action, Race, and the Constitution: From Bakke to Grutter,
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on the basis of the so-called "remedy" rationale established in the grade
school context, even though the racial discrimination supposedly being
remedied might be hard to find. All that was necessary was to adopt the
fundamental liberal assumption that any black shortcoming must be the
result of racial discrimination, with no further evidence needed.
This was the position taken, as would be expected, by the Brennan-
led four Justices in Bakke. The need to find race discrimination
requiring remedy, in the absence of any evidence of such discrimination
by the University of California at Davis Medical School, was supplied
by relying on "societal discrimination. '"86 Justice Ginsburg's concurring
opinion in Grutter, joined by Justice Breyer, took essentially the same
position,87 and Justices Stevens and Souter are clearly also willing to
take such a position. 88  The only reason the justification for race
preferences in higher education moved from the conventional, though
baseless, remedy rationale to the ludicrous diversity rationale is that the
''conservative" Justice Powell was unwilling to accept a rationale that
would justify any preference for blacks-indeed, it is "patently
unconstitutional," he insisted, to discriminate simply to increase black
"representation"-but also unwilling to insist on the invalidation of all
preferences for them. In effect, his position was that discrimination
against whites is as equally prohibited as discrimination against blacks,
except that if done subtly enough-as by those clever folks at
Harvard-just a little would be okay. 89 This self-contradictory position
became the position of the Court in Grutter because the similarly
"conservative" Justice O'Connor had essentially trapped herself into
adopting it, whether she agreed with it or not.
Justice O'Connor was the author of the Court's two leading opinions
invalidating race preferences, Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co.90 and
92 Ky. L.J. 219, 219 (2003-04) (emphasis in original).
86. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 328 (1978) (Brennan, White,
Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
87. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 345-46 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (asserting
that the continued existence of conscious and unconscious racial bias and discussing the
inadequate and unequal opportunities for minority students).
88. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 296 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting) (Souter joining
Justice Ginsburg's dissenting statement that "government decisionmakers may properly
distinguish between policies of exclusion and inclusion"); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,
515 U.S. 200, 243 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that "[r]emedial race-based preferences
reflect ... a desire to foster equality in society").
89. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316-19 (referring to the Harvard College program as an
"illuminating example" of a university admissions program that considers a combination of
applicant characteristics, including race).
90. Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena.9 1  In them, she emphatically
insisted, over impassioned dissents, that "strict scrutiny" applies to all
official race discrimination, 92 and that the remedy rationale requires
substantial evidence of racial discrimination by the institution using race
preferences. 93  She had, therefore, effectively precluded herself from
holding otherwise in Grutter.94 As the swing vote, she was in a position
to make the four committed liberals purport to agree with the untenable
proposition that a state has a compelling interest, as strict scrutiny
requires, in racially discriminating in order to obtain educationally
valuable "diversity" in an elite state law school, even though as true
liberals they are ideologically committed to the view that strict scrutiny
is not applicable-no compelling interest is necessary-when a state is
discriminating in favor of blacks.
The liberal position that official discrimination meant to advantage
blacks should be treated more leniently than discrimination
disadvantaging them is neither illogical nor necessarily prohibited by
the holding of Brown, which involved only the latter. There is no
escaping its inconsistency, however, with the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
each title of which applies and was meant to apply to all race
discrimination. 95 It also deprives what everyone, including Congress,
understood to be the Brown principle -government may not treat
people differently on the basis of race-of the seeming moral stature
and appeal that made it irresistible. It seemingly converts the principle
into a matter of ad hoc policy preference subject to the powerful and
frequently quoted, including by Justice Powell in Bakke, criticism by
Alexander Bickel:
The lesson of the great decisions of the Supreme Court and the lesson
of contemporary history have been the same for at least a generation:
discrimination on the basis of race is illegal, immoral,
unconstitutional, inherently wrong, and destructive of democratic
society. Now this is to be unlearned and we are told that this is not a
matter of fundamental principle but only a matter of whose ox is
gored. Those for whom racial equality was demanded are to be more
equal than others. Having found support in the Constitution for
91. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 200.
92. Id. at 237; Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
93. Croson, 488 U.S. at 505.
94. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237 (applying "strict scrutiny" to use of racial preference in
federal government contracting); Croson, 488 U.S. at 493, 505 (applying "strict scrutiny" to use
of race preference in city contracting).
95. See GRAGLIA, supra note 2, at 46-66 (discussing that the purpose of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 was to prohibit racial discrimination in education, employment, public accommodations,
and federally assisted programs).
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equality, they now claim support for inequality under the same
Constitution. 96
The relatively conservative instincts of Justices Powell and O'Connor
on race issues probably caused them to be attracted to Bickel's view,
but they both also seemed emotionally opposed to taking a clear and
simple position on almost any issue. It was probably too much to
expect O'Connor to flatly condemn race preferences, bucking the
virtually unanimous view of the liberal academic establishment,
especially when even the Bush administration was unwilling to do so.
To have done so would have been to lose all academic respectability
and be reduced, like Justices Scalia and Thomas, to figures of scorn and
calumny in liberal academia. Further, O'Connor's willingness to join
the four liberals on especially important issues makes her arguably the
most important person in the country, 97 probably not an uncomfortable
or unwelcome position.
D. The Non-Distinction Between Seeking a Racial "Critical Mass"
and Seeking Increased Racial Representation
Given that the basic premise of Grutter-that the purpose of race
preferences in admission to elite schools is academic diversity-is false,
it is not surprising that almost every statement made to explicate and
justify it is also false. A typically illogical example is the Court's
acceptance of the law school's argument, essential to the decision, that
it was not seeking to enroll any particular number of blacks-that would
be a clearly impermissible "quota"-but merely to obtain a "critical
mass" of blacks in each entering class.98 All representatives of the
school adamantly refused to define "critical mass" in terms of any
number or percentage or range of numbers or percentages on the theory,
apparently, that seeking a "critical mass" of something does not involve
seeking any number or percentage as long as none are admitted. The
result was that "critical mass" was defined only as a group large enough
that individual members would "not feel isolated or like spokespersons
for their race" 99 and would contribute the group's presumed unique
96. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 133 (1975).
97. Justice O'Connor, but not Chief Justice Rehnquist or Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld, for example, is listed in a recent Time magazine article as one of the 100 most
influential people in the world. See Michael Elliot, The People Who Shape Our World: Our List
of Those Whose Power, Influence or Moral Example Touches the Lives of All of Us, Right Now,
TIME, Apr. 26, 2004, at 50 (listing Justice O'Connor as a person who shapes our world); Walter
Isaacson, Sandra Day O'Connor: Good Sense, Swing Vote, TIME, Apr. 26, 2004, at 104 (noting
O'Connor's importance as a swing voter on the Court).
98. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329-30 (2003).
99. Id. at 319.
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perspective and yet show, paradoxically, that members had no one
perspective.
Chief Justice Rehnquist had no difficulty demonstrating that the
"critical mass" argument is a "sham."' 100 The number of applicants
admitted from each of the preferred groups, "African-American,"
"Hispanic," and "Native American," followed closely, he showed, that
group's percentage of total applications. 10 1 It could hardly have been
more clear that the school was simply seeking proportional
"representation" of each preferred group, which the Court insisted, as
had Powell, is "patently unconstitutional." 10 2  "[O]ne would have to
believe," Chief Justice Rehnquist pointed out, that a "critical mass"
could be "achieved with only half the number of Hispanics and one-
sixth the number of Native Americans as compared to African-
Americans." 10 3 Indeed, in one year, just three was enough for Native
Americans. 104
E. The Reality of Poor Black Academic Performance
Closely related to the pretense that the purpose of race preference
programs is not simply to increase black enrollment is the pretense that
each applicant is given "truly individualized consideration" and put into
"competition for admission" with all other candidates, with "race or
ethnicity" considered "only as a 'plus' in a particular applicant's
file." 10 5  The fact is that selective schools have race preference
admission programs only because blacks as a group are not
academically competitive with whites and Asians, and the academic gap
is much too large to be closed by using race "only as a 'plus"' factor.
The reality that is at the basis of race preference programs in selective
institutions of higher education is that:
At least in America, the average white child scores about 15 points
higher on standardized tests than the average black child. This
disparity is apparent among first graders, and it persists throughout
school and college. In terms of mental ages or grade levels, blacks fall
further and further behind whites. The average black 6 year old is 1
year behind the average white 6 year old. By the time he is 12, the
average black child is scoring at the same level as the average white
100. Id. at 383 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 383-85 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 329-30; Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 319-20 (1978).
103. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 381 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 381 n.* (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (characterizing the law school's assertion that
the enrollment of three Native Americans would constitute a "critical mass" as "absurd").
105. Id. at 334.
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10 year old. The average black 18 year old has scores comparable to a
white 14 or 15 year old.
These differences are quite consistent on both IQ and achievement
tests. Some studies report racial differences of less than 15 points,
while others report more, but virtually none report anything like equal
performance. 106
It is an artifact of a normal, bell-shaped curve distribution that a small
difference in median scores makes for large differences at the extremes,
and a fifteen percent difference, exceeding a standard deviation, is not
small. One effect of the difference at the lower end of the distribution is
that only eleven percent of blacks have an intelligence quotient ("IQ")
of 100 or more, compared to fifty percent of whites. 107 At the upper
end, of more relevance to higher education, 2.32% of blacks score at or
above 110, compared to 30.9% of whites; and 0.32% of blacks score at
or above 120, compared to 13.4% for whites. 10 8 An IQ of 110 may be
taken, very conservatively (120 is more realistic, at least for selective
schools), as the minimum required for admission to a graduate or
professional school. 10 9 Given that blacks make up about 13% of the
American population and achieve an IQ of 110 at a rate less than one-
tenth the rate of whites, they cannot be expected to make up more than
1.3% of admissions to graduate and professional schools.
For the average black twelfth grader performing at about the level of
the average white or Asian eighth grader in reading and math, 10
obtaining a high school education is difficult enough, to say nothing of
gaining admission to a selective college. The average black college
applicant has a combined Scholastic Assessment Test ("SAT") score
about 200 points lower than the average score of whites and Asians.
111
106. CHRISTOPHER JENCKS ET AL., INEQUALITY: A REASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECT OF
FAMILY AND SCHOOLING IN AMERICA 81-82 (1972); MICHAEL LEVIN, WHY RACE MATrERS
34-37 (1997). See also generally RICHARD J. HERNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL
CURVE: INTELLIGENCE AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE 276-80 (1994) (confirming
the existence of a difference in the performance of blacks and whites on tests of cognitive ability).
107. Linda S. Gottfredson, Reconsidering Fairness: A Matter of Social and Ethical Priorities,
33 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 293, 301-02 (1988).
108. Id.
109. See id. at 303 (stating that an IQ score of 115 is generally considered necessary to get the
"grades that would qualify one for admission to a professional and graduate school").
110. See, e.g., THERNSTROM, supra note 81, at 354, 357 (illustrating "the immense racial gulf
in cognitive skills between white and black children"). In 1994 "the average African-American
high school senior had math skills precisely on a par with those of the typical white in the middle
of the ninth grade," and "blacks aged seventeen could read as well on the average as the typical
white child who was a month past his or her thirteenth birthday." Id.
11l. WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK C. BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER 20 (1998). "In 1982
selective colleges were as likely to admit a black student with total SAT scores of 1100 and a B+
average as they were to admit a white student with total SAT scores of 1300 and an A-
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In 1995, blacks from families earning $50,000 or more scored lower
than whites from families earning $10,000 or less. Contrary to Justice
O'Connor's fanciful claim that race preferences can be expected to end
in twenty five years because of black academic improvement,112 the gap
in SAT scores is not narrowing but increasing, having gone from 187
points in 1993 to 206 in 2003.113
The size of the qualification gap that must be bridged to admit a
substantial number of blacks to selective graduate and professional
schools is, of course, at least as great. blacks make up more than ten
percent (about 9,500 out of 90,000) of annual takers of the Law School
Admissions Test ("LSAT"), for example, but very few score at the
highest levels. In the 2001-02 school year, the number of blacks
scoring at or above the 91.3 percentile with a college grade point
average ("GPA") of 3.50 or better was twenty-nine. 114 That is fewer
blacks than the Harvard Law School alone enrolls, but the median score
at Harvard and the nation's other half-dozen most selective law schools
is at about the 98th percentile with a GPA of 3.75,115 at which level the
average .... [W]e doubt that the extent of racial preferences changed much between 1982 and
1995." Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips, The Black-White Test Score Gap: An
Introduction, in THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP 1, 37 (Christopher Jencks & Meredith
Phillips eds., 1998) (citing Thomas J. Kane, Racial and Ethnic Preferences in College
Admissions, in THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP 431, 437) "In fact, African-American
applicants enjoy an advantage equivalent to... 400 points on the SAT." Kane, supra, at 432.
112. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003).
113. See Press Release, College Board, SAT Verbal and Math Scores Up Significantly as
Record-Breaking Number of Students Take the Test: Average Math Score at Highest Level in
More than 35 Years at II (Aug. 26, 2003) (reporting that in 1993 blacks scored an average of
850 (429 verbal, 421 math) while whites scored a total of 1037 (520 verbal, 517 math) and
reporting that in 2003 blacks scored an average of 857 (431 verbal, 426 math) while whites
scored an average of 1063 (529 verbal, 534 math)).
114. LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL, NATIONAL STATISTICAL REPORT, 1997-98 TO
2001-02 (2003).
115. See Harvard Law School, J.D. Admissions Facts and Statistics, at
http://law.harvard.edu/admissions/jd/HLSfaqs.php (last visited Sept. 4, 2004) (stating, that for the
entering class of 2003, ten percent of the 553 total students enrolled were black/African-
American and reporting that the 75/25 percentile GPAs for the class of 2003 were 3.94/3.76 and
the 75/25 percentile LSATs were 174/169); see also Columbia Law School, Class Profile: Class
of 2006, at http://law.columbia.edu/prosp-students/jd-prog/applic-inf/Class-Profile.html (last
visited Sept. 4, 2004) (reporting that out of 395 admitted and enrolled students the total minorities
enrolled comprised thirty-one percent of the class and of those minorities, a total of forty, or ten
percent of the class, was black/African-American, and reporting that the median LSAT was 170
and the median undergraduate GPA was 3.68); Georgetown Law School, Frequently Asked
Questions, at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/admissions/faq.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2004)
(noting that for the entering class of 2003 the median undergraduate GPA was 3.64 and the
median LSAT was 169 and twenty-six percent of the class was an ethnic minority); Stanford Law
School, J.D. Program Admissions, at http://www.law.stanford.edu/admissions/jd/admissions.html
(last visited Sept. 4, 2004) (noting that the 170 members of the Class of 2005 were drawn from
the upper five percent of their undergraduate class and the upper five percent of the LSAT pool);
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number of black applicants approaches zero. Former Harvard President
Derek Bok's estimate that if not given preference, the number of blacks
at selective schools could be expected to drop to less than 1.5% was, if
anything, an overstatement.
Harvard and nearly all other elite schools consider it politically and
ideologically necessary, however, to enroll a much more substantial
number of blacks, at least 5-10% of the entering class. It is
preposterous to purport to believe that this can be done by tipping
balances in favor of blacks in close cases. It can only be done by a
process of "race-norming," whereby blacks are made to compete only
with other blacks, and admitting virtually all of the highest scoring
blacks until the desired number is reached, while hundreds of better
qualified, separately-considered whites and Asians are passed over.
Because the basic purpose of the programs is to make it appear that
blacks can qualify for admission to selective schools, the schools
necessarily make every effort to keep the public uninformed or, even
better, like the Harvard College Admissions Program, misinformed as to
what they are doing. But litigation forces them to make some
disclosure. A table Justice Powell included in his Bakke opinion
showed that regular admittees had an average score at the 76th
percentile on the quantitative section of the Medical College Admission
Test, while the average score of the racially preferred (probably inflated
because it included some Asians) was at the 24th percentile. 116  The
schools nonetheless invariably insist that the racially preferred
admittees are "fully qualified," even if not the most qualified. The Fifth
Circuit opinion in Hopwood v. Texas states that at the University of
Texas Law School the presumptive admit score for blacks and Mexican-
Americans was lower than the presumptive reject score for whites and
Asians.'1 7  At the University of Michigan, "the advantage of being
University of California Berkeley Boalt School of Law, Frequently Asked Questions, at
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/prospectives/ admissions/jddegree/faq.html (last visited Sept. 4,
2004) (reporting that in an average class size of between 270 and 280 for the past several years,
the median GPA and LSAT score of admitted applicants has been between 3.7-3.8 and 167-169,
respectively); Yale Law School, J.D. Summary of Yale Law School Applicants for 2001, 2002,
2003, at http://www.law.yale.edu/ outside/html/Admissions/admis-jdoverview.htm (last visited
Sept. 4, 2004) (summarizing applicant and admitted student numbers where the bulk of admitted
students from 2001-03 had an LSAT score between 165 and 180 and a GPA of 3.75 or better but
failing to mention the ethnic composition of each entering class); cf. KATHRYN HOFFMAN ET AL.,
NAT'L CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF EDUCATION, STATUS AND TRENDS
IN THE EDUCATION OF BLACKS 96 (Sept. 2003) (reporting that in 1999-2000 only about five
percent of blacks earned doctoral degrees and only seven percentr of blacks earned first
professional degrees).
116. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 277 (1978).
117. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 936 (5th Cir. 1996).
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black, Hispanic, or Native American is even greater than [400 SAT
points]; they receive the equivalent of a full point of GPA," with the
result that "minority status" may "override any SAT score deficit."
Further, "the odds of a black student being admitted compared to a
white student with the same SAT and GPA were 173 to 1 at
M ichigan .. " 118
Justice O'Connor attempted to obscure the magnitude of the
preference given blacks and only blacks by stating that the law school
"frequently accepts non-minority applicants with grades and test scores
lower than underrepresented minority applicants ... who are
rejected." 119 She based this on the law school's claim that "[s]ixty-nine
minority applicants were rejected between 1995 and 2000" with scores
higher than those of some whites and Asians who were admitted.
120
O'Connor found the argument impressive enough to retain even after
Chief Justice Rehnquist pointed out that the correct number was sixty-
seven and that fifty-six of them were Hispanic, and only six were
black. 121
The figures showed, incidentally, that while Hispanics were strongly
preferred to whites and Asians, they were strongly disfavored with
respect to blacks. In 2000, when twelve blacks and twelve Hispanics
applied with LSAT scores of 159-160 and GPAs of 3.00 or better, all of
the blacks, but only two of the Hispanics were admitted. 122 In the same
year, one of sixteen Hispanics and fourteen of twenty-three blacks were
admitted with LSAT scores of 151-153 and a 3.00 GPA. 12 3 None of
this data was sufficient, apparently, to give O'Connor and those who
joined her opinion a clue that the purpose of the program was to enroll
more blacks.
F. The False Promise of a Constitutional Time Limit
on Race Preferences
Equally misleading is Justice O'Connor's statement that in the
twenty-five years since Bakke, "the number of minority applicants with
high grades and test scores has indeed increased."' 124 She retained this
statement in the face of Justice Thomas's opinion pointing out the
118. Peter H. Schuck, Affirmative Action: Past, Present, and Future, 20 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 1, 20 (2002).
119. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 338 (2003).
120. Brief for Respondent at 10, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-24 1).
121. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 382 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
122. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
123. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
124. id. at 343.
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absence of "any evidence that the gap in credentials between black and
white students is shrinking" 125 and that the percentage of black
applicants scoring 165 or higher on the LSAT 126 did not increase
between 1993 (1.1%) and 2000 (1.0%).127 The absolute number of
blacks with high LSAT scores increased between 1984 and 2000 only
because a much larger number took the test. 128 As noted above, 129 the
black/white SAT score gap is widening, not closing.
G. Obtaining the "Highly Qualified" by Preferring the Less Qualified
An argument thought by many to have had a particular influence on
the Grutter decision is that the military needs a "highly qualified,
racially diverse officer corps."'130 If "highly qualified, racially diverse"
is not an oxymoron, it is at least a joining of concepts in conflict when
diversity is achieved by race preferences. To the extent that the officer
corps is "racially diverse" (has more blacks) because of race
preferences-which is all that is at issue-it will, by definition, be less
highly qualified. The argument frequently heard that soldiers need or
want leaders "who look like them," if taken seriously, leads in the
direction of a return to a segregated military. Looking at the argument
from the ground up, it seems unlikely that soldiers in the field would
prefer a commander "who looks like them" to a better qualified one of a
different race.
V. CONCLUSION: A FRAUDULENT DEFENSE IS EVIDENCE OF
INDEFENSIBILITY
An element of pretense is undoubtedly inevitable in judicial opinion
writing. Decisions are ideally shown to result from the impersonal
application of pre-existing authoritative rules, when in fact there rarely
are such rules as to issues reaching the Supreme Court, or as in Grutter,
the rules seem to require the opposite of the desired result. Judicial
opinion writing is, therefore, something of a game, and one cannot
expect judges to abide by standards of candor applicable in truth-
seeking academic disciplines. Judges are, after all, only lawyers,
trained in the manipulation of language to reach pre-determined results,
125. Id. at 375-76 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 376 n.14 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that a score of 165 was "the relevant
score range for applicant consideration (absent race discrimination)").
127. Id. at 375-76 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 376 n.15 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
129. See supra note 114 and accompanying text (noting the widening gap between black test
scores and those of whites and Asians).
130. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331.
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and inured to the unembarrassed assertion of fiction. There should
nonetheless be some limit, some requirement of minimal honesty, on
what even judges are permitted to say, unless the entire legal system is
to degenerate into a farce. By purporting to believe that the purpose of
the University of Michigan Law School's racially discriminatory
admissions program was to serve a "compelling interest" in obtaining
an educationally valuable student "diversity" 131 and that black
applicants were not put on "separate admission tracks,"' 132 the Court
takes the use of patent falsehood and hypocrisy beyond those limits.
Officials remote from external control-of which Supreme Court
Justices are the American paradigm-are inevitably tempted to believe
that their assumed exceptional wisdom and benevolence exempts them
from moral constraints. The point of generally accepted moral
principles is to warn judgment away from this temptation. If honesty is
not always, it is at least usually, the best policy. The fact that something
can only be done dishonestly is a good indication that it probably should
not be done and is not likely to have good long-term results. Racially
preferential admission to selective colleges and universities is a policy
that seems to have almost everything to be said against it, most of which
is said in Justice Thomas's dissenting opinion, and little to be said for it.
That the Court could only justify it dishonestly is strong evidence that it
cannot be justified.
Racially preferential admission to institutions of higher education are
overwhelmingly opposed by the American people, and rejected by them
at every opportunity. 133 How, then, can they continue to exist in a
supposedly democratic system of government? The answer, of course,
is that they are ardently and almost unanimously favored by the liberal
academic establishment which controls the universities and the media,
and which has no difficulty in assuming the superiority of its views on
public policy to those of the American public. For an academic to
openly oppose racial preferences today would be virtually to disqualify
himself from a high administrative position at a major university. He
131. Id. at 328.
132. Id. at 334-36.
133. See Associated Press, Poll: Split on College Affirmative Action (April 28, 2003),
available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2003-04-28-affirmative-action-x.htm
(discussing a poll finding that sixty-four percent of Americans believe that "minority students
should not be admitted to a school if their grades and test scores didn't meet the level of other
applicants .... "); Gary Langer, Assistance, But Not Preference: Poll: Most Share Bush's View on
Affirmative Action (Jan 27, 2003), available at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/us/DailyNews/
poll-affirmativeaction030l27.html (discussing an ABC News/Washington Post poll finding that
sixty-six percent of Americans oppose preference programs and thirty percent support preference
programs).
2004]
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
would never make it past the search committees, the membership of
which is itself invariably the result of race preferences. On this issue as
on all or nearly all others in the "culture war," liberal academia, Grutter
illustrates, has in the Supreme Court an invaluable ally that accords it
extreme deference.
The arguments against race preferences in higher education are by
now so familiar as not to require lengthy recitation. They include that
their effect is to increase race consciousness and divisiveness. They
virtually demand the formation of racially based groups in every
organization and institution to fight for racial advantage and resist racial
disadvantage. It does blacks a dubious favor to place them in schools
for which they do not meet the ordinary qualifications, in effect
guaranteeing that they play in a league in which they are not fully
competitive. It also does them a dubious favor to accept as official
national policy the proposition that they cannot and, therefore, should
not be expected to compete with whites and Asians on equal terms in
academic pursuits. Preference for blacks carries a message to them,
John McWhorter has argued, that reliance on race can be a substitute for
reliance on effort.134  If blacks may be exempt from college and
university admission standards applicable to others, why should they
not, the question arises, also be exempt from other onerous
requirements applicable to others? Acceptance of a general black
exemption from requirements applicable to others means, however, the
end of hope for a multiracial integrated society, because the only
possible response of those who must comply with established standards
to those who need not is to seek separation.
Race preferences cannot be expected, as Justice O'Connor fatuously
assumed, to come to an end. Experience shows, as Thomas Sowell, our
most perceptive and knowledgeable student of the subject, has reported
in detail, that they only expand and become more deeply entrenched. 135
As Sowell's study of its results across the world shows, "the destructive
effects of a policy of race preferences in every society that adopts it is
not a matter of speculation or prediction."' 136 It is unlikely that history
will look kindly on Justices Powell and O'Connor for finding dishonest
means of upholding that policy.
134. JOHN H. MCWHORTER, LOSING THE RACE: SELF-SABOTAGE IN BLACK AMERICA 223
(2000).
135. THOMAS SOWELL, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AROUND THE WORLD: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY
2 (2004).
136. Id. at 196-97.
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